2. FAMILY
A. Spousal support
Leading
Cases
Murdoch v. Murdoch [1975] 1 S.C.R. 423, Supreme Court of Canada
http://www.uniset.ca/other/cs4/19751SCR423.html
The Supreme
Court upheld the trial
judge's finding that a farm wife’s labour was not beyond what was normally
expected of a ranch wife and that since there was no financial contribution
there was no resulting trust upon marriage breakdown.
Messier v. Delage [1983] 2
S.C.R. 401, Supreme Court of Canada
http://www.canlii.ca/ca/cas/scc/1983/1983scc10015.html
Ex-husband
applied to the Court to have his spousal support payments reduced on the
grounds that his wife had a Masters degree and should be able to enter the work
force. The Supreme Court held that a
variation on a support order could not be granted based on what may happen in
the future. Any variation must be based
on the reality of the parties at the time of the consideration of the
variation.
Moge v. Moge,
[1992] 3 S.C.R. 813, Supreme Court of Canada
http://www.canlii.ca/ca/cas/scc/1992/1992scc111.html
In determining a spouse's entitlement to support, the court
must consider all objectives defined in sections 15(7) and 17(7) of the Divorce
Act. Economic self-sufficiency was not to be given priority over the other
objectives. The Divorce Act intended to deal with the economic
consequences of divorce for both parties. In exercising its
discretion in ordering support, the court must consider a variety of factors
and decisions made during the marriage which disadvantaged one spouse and
benefitted the other upon the breakdown of the marriage. In the
present case, the wife sustained a substantial economic disadvantage from the
marriage and from her responsibility for the children's upbringing after the
divorce. Consequently, her ability to
earn an income was diminished and she continued to suffer economic hardship as
a result. The wife had not become economically self-sufficient.
G. (L.) v. B. (G.),
[1995] 3 S.C.R. 370
http://www.canlii.org/ca/cas/scc/1995/1995scc74.html
Ex-wife was living with a new male companion and receiving support payments from her ex-husband. The ex-husband applied to have the support order varied on the grounds that the ex-wife was receiving support from her new male companion. The Court held that there must be a material change in circumstances before a variation will be granted. The fact that the wife's companion contributed to the expenses did not mean that the wife was self-sufficient and no variation was awarded.
Miron v. Trudel,
[1995] 2 S.C.R. 418
http://www.canlii.org/ca/cas/scc/1995/1995scc48.html
The exclusion of unmarried couples from insurance benefits available to married couples was discriminatory. Marital status was an analogous ground of discrimination under section 15. Common law spouses constituted an historically disadvantaged group and individuals were not always free to choose to marry or not to marry. The breach of section 15(1) was not justified by section 1 of the Charter.
M. v. H.,
[1999] 2 S.C.R. 3
http://www.canlii.org/ca/cas/scc/1999/1999scc28.html
Supreme Court upheld the declaration that the opposite-sex definition of spouse in section 29 of the Family Law Act violated the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
Bracklow v. Bracklow [1999] S.C.J.
No. 14, Supreme Court of Canada
http://www.canlii.ca/ca/cas/scc/1999/1999scc15.html
Ex-wife was unable to work due to her illness. It was found that she was entitled to spousal support due to the interdependent nature of the marriage during its final years. The fact that it was her illness that contributed to her inability to work did not mean that she was not entitled to apply for spousal support.
http://www.canlii.org/ca/cas/scc/2001/2001scc43.html
Ex-husband applied for a variation to his spousal support payments due to a change in his financial circumstances. Court lowered the monthly payments and found that the ex-wife had to use the assets received on equalization to provide for her future support on the basis that the payee spouse should attempt to achieve economic self-sufficiency.
http://www.canlii.org/ca/cas/scc/2002/2002scc83.html
The
Matrimonial Property Act does not provide for a division of property upon
relationship dissolution for common law spouses. This does not violate the equality rights of
common law partners as the decision to marry is encapsulated within the spouses'
consent to be bound by the Act's proprietary regime.
Miglin v. Miglin,
[2003] 1 S.C.R. 303
http://www.canlii.org/ca/cas/scc/2003/2003scc24.html
There is a two step process for interfering with separation agreements. First, the court must determine whether there were any reasons to discount the agreement. This involves determining whether the agreement was in substantial compliance with the Divorce Act. Second, the court should assess the extent to which the agreement still reflected the parties' original intention and the extent to which it was still in compliance with the objectives of the Divorce.
Hartshorne v.
Hartshorne, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 550
http://www.canlii.org/ca/cas/scc/2004/2004scc22.html
To be enforceable, a marriage contract had to operate fairly
at the time of distribution. To
determine whether the marriage contract was substantively fair, the court had
to consider whether the circumstances of the parties at the time of separation
were within their reasonable contemplation when the contract was formed, and
whether they made adequate arrangements to address those anticipated
circumstances.